Over the last two decades the distribution of private household expenditures has become more unequal in Laos, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.311 to 0.364, even though absolute poverty incidence has halved. The increase in inequality was statistically significant and reduced the average rate of poverty reduction per year by about 28 percent, meaning the actual rate compared with the counterfactual rate that would have occurred if the mean real expenditures had increased at their observed levels but inequality had not changed. When the data are decomposed into rural and urban areas of residence or by province, or by the ethnicity of the household head, the increase in inequality within groups dominates any changes between groups; inequality has increased throughout the country. In contrast, access to publicly provided services has become more equal; disparities in participation rates between richer and poorer groups have diminished.
Introduction
This paper describes changes in inequality in the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR), subsequently Laos, for brevity, over the last two decades and relates them to the poverty reduction that has occurred simultaneously. Since the early 1990s, five rounds of the Lao Expenditure and Consumption Surveys (LECS) have been conducted and these data are the principal information source used in this paper. 1 The data measure consumption expenditures, but not incomes, at the household level. Based on this sample survey, measured inequality has increased at the national level, within both rural and urban areas and within each of the four major ethnic groups. The estimated Gini coefficient of expenditure inequality has risen from 0.311 to 0.364 at the national level and the increase in this sample-based estimate of population-wide inequality is statistically significant. At the same time, the estimated incidence of absolute poverty has halved, from 46 percent of the population to 23 percent. Put together, these facts mean that the poor of Laos have become better off in real terms, but that the rich have benefited more, in both proportionate and absolute terms. A measure of the importance of this increase in inequality is that if the real expenditures of all household groups had, hypothetically, increased at the same rate, meaning that inequality had remained unchanged at its 1992-93 level, absolute poverty incidence would have declined from 46 percent to 17 percent. That is, increased inequality reduced the amount of poverty reduction that occurred over the last two decades by around 6 percent of the population, compared with the hypothetical reduction that would have occurred if inequality had not risen.
Section 2 reviews the reasons for concern about inequality in a poor country like Laos, drawing upon the somewhat ambivalent international economic literature on this subject. Section 3 summarizes the data on economic growth, inequality and poverty incidence in Laos over the two decades 1992-93 to 2012-13, showing the coexistence of a seemingly large rise in measured inequality and a decline in absolute poverty incidence. Section 4 asks whether the sample-based increase in the estimated level of inequality is a statistically significant indicator of a rise in inequality for the population as a whole and concludes that it is. This section also assesses the importance of the rise in expenditure inequality in terms of its impact on the decline in poverty incidence that occurred over the same period. Section 5 asks whether the population-wide increase in inequality can be attributed to between-group or within-group changes, where the groups considered are provinces, rural/urban areas of residence and the ethnicity of the household head. It is shown that within-group changes dominate in all three cases. Section 6
The important complication is that the rate of growth is not necessarily exogenous. It may be influenced by the same factors that impinge on the level of inequality and changes in it. Dollar and Kraay (2002) famously showed that there is no correlation between changes in inequality and the rate of growth. That is, 'on average', growth is distribution-neutral, implying that economic growth must be poverty-reducing. But around this 'average' story, the experiences of individual countries vary widely. The economic literature is ambivalent on the relationship between inequality and growth. On the one hand, a long-standing theoretical contention is that because richer groups save a higher proportion of their incomes, inequality promotes growth by raising aggregate savings and thus facilitating higher levels of growth-promoting investment. The empirical basis for this argument is that richer groups have higher average and marginal propensities to save. In the early stages of development, the rate of return to physical capital is high, and thus inequality promotes growth by raising the aggregate propensity to save (Kaldor 1957) . The existence of investment indivisibilities in combination with poorly functioning capital markets may accentuate this effect because only the rich can afford the large outlays needed for productive capital formation (Aghion et al.' 1999) . 2 A problem with these arguments is that 'growth' is not a uniform process. Its sectoral composition may also be important. For example, the same aggregate rate of GDP growth can result from a wide range of combinations of different growth rates of agriculture, industry and services, which may have widely different implications for the poor and for measured inequality. The question of whether 'growth' raises or lowers inequality is surely crude at best. Whether higher levels of inequality produce a form of growth that benefits the poor more than the supposedly lower rates resulting from less inequality (and hence less savings) is a question that this literature does not address.
Much recent literature implies a negative relationship between inequality and growth, or more correctly, that high levels of inequality may coexist with retarded growth. But this does not necessarily mean that the two are causally related. For example, if credit market imperfections mean that the poor lack access to credit that can finance investment in physical and human capital, this will produce both higher levels of inequality than would otherwise exist and lower levels of growth. The lower growth would then not be caused by the inequality itself, but both would be the consequence of a third factor -in this case, the credit market failures. High regulatory set-up costs for small business would amplify this outcome by restricting low-income people to activities in the informal sector (Aghion and Bolton 1997; Banerjee and Newman 1993; Galor and Zeira 1993) . Low institutional quality can produce similar outcomes. Because of the economic and political dominance of small groups, lobbying activities may present a waste of resources derived from rent seeking and corruption, both accentuating inequality and lowering growth (Chong and Gradstein 2007; Keefer and Knack 2002; Sonin 2003) .
It is important that in this, largely theoretical literature, inequality and slow growth are both attributed to other, underlying structural problems. High levels of inequality coexist with slow growth, but the inequality does not in itself cause the slow growth. Correcting the underlying problem would both reduce inequality and improve growth. But redistributive solutions to the high inequality would not redress that underlying problem and would not necessarily raise the rate of growth. That is, rising inequality and slower growth could both be symptoms of the existence of inequality-producing and growth-retarding market failures and/or policy failures.
The extent to which inequality is bad for poor countries presumably depends on whether it is transitory or persistent. If it persists, in that inequality begets more inequality, it could increase social tensions and disruptions to peace and order. This will harm growth, and thereby undermine further attempts at reducing poverty (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Benabou 1996) . Rising inequality in countries where a large proportion of the population remains poor may indicate that a significant share of the labor force is either underemployed or unemployed, or at least not participating fully in the growth process. This could put at risk the sustainability of the growth process itself. If it is transitory, in the form posited by the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis , then its detrimental effects will be short-lived. Whether rising inequality is likely to be persistent or transitory depends on a number of factors, not least the underlying causes of the high or rising inequality, as well as reactions to it through policy changes.
The linkages between poverty reduction, inequality and growth are complex and subject to continuing controversy. What is not controversial is that for social, economic and political reasons, economic inequality needs to be monitored and understood. That is the central task of this paper.
Laos: Economic growth, rising inequality, declining poverty

Background on the Lao economy
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Laos remained extremely poor and isolated-the outcome of decades of conflict and inward-looking policies derived from a central planning policy framework in place since the communist takeover of 1975. In 1986 the government began decentralizing control and introducing market-oriented reforms under a revised economic strategy called the New Economic Mechanism (NEM). Early reforms under the NEM removed price controls, unified exchange rates, expanded foreign and inter-provincial trade, and encouraged private enterprise in agriculture and manufacturing. Structural reforms continued in the 1990s through a legislative program providing the foundation for market-based rules and private sector development. The centerpiece of this program was the Lao PDR Constitution of 1991, which protects private forms of ownership.
These early reforms produced impressive results. Between 1990 and 1997, just prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), GDP growth averaged 6.4 percent a year. Economic growth contracted in 1998 as a result of the AFC. A concurrent attempt by the Bank of Lao to enforce a decree requiring exclusive use of the local currency (kip) resulted in massive capital flight. Expanded public infrastructure expenditures financed by monetary expansion produced a hyperinflation in 1997 and especially 1988, but the increased aggregate demand enabled the worst effects of the AFC (as experienced in Thailand, for example) to be avoided. By 1999 real economic growth had recovered and continued reforms have since allowed growth at an average of 7 percent a year, despite the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Sustained growth allowed real per capita income to triple, from $262 in 1990 to $794 in 2014, in constant 2005 dollar terms ( Figure 1 ).
Overall growth has been accompanied by a gradual shift away from agriculture, which had traditionally fuelled growth in Laos. The average annual growth rates of industry and services have outstripped agriculture since the 1990s and these two sectors each now account for a larger share of value added than agriculture (Menon and Warr 2013) . While agriculture accounted for about 61 percent of value added in 1990, and about 45 percent by 2000, its share had fallen to about 28 percent by 2014, while industry and services accounted to 31 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Nevertheless, around 80 percent of the population (5.6 million out of the total population in 2015 of 7 million) continue to derive their income mainly from agriculture. Agriculture remains largely subsistence-based, with some emerging plantation and contract farming (UNDP 2007 and World Bank 2010) .
Industry's growing importance was initially fuelled by a growth in manufacturing, particularly in textiles and garments. But by 2000 non-manufacturing industries-mining, construction, electricity, water, and gas-made up the bulk of industry's value added. While the share of manufacturing in GDP averaged about 14 percent in the 1990s, it fell to about 8 percent from 2000 onwards. Resource-based output increased sharply as a share of GDP from just 5.5 percent in 1999 to above 27 percent in 2011. Exports of minerals and electricity and investments in hydropower have driven much of this shift (ADB 2011 , World Bank 2012 .
Lao data on inequality and poverty
Before turning to the Lao evidence on inequality and poverty, the data issues involved in measuring these concepts must be reviewed. Regrettably, the methods used to measure inequality and poverty differ widely between countries and this fact limits to degree to which the resulting measures can be compared meaningfully across countries. Virtually all countries use sample surveys to collect economic data at the household level and then use these sample-based data to estimate indicators of inequality and poverty for the population as a whole. But the uniformity ends there. Some use household income as the basis for inequality and poverty estimation; others use household expenditures. Some calculate income or expenditure per household, regardless of its size, others per household member, others per 'adult equivalent' at the household level. All countries include an estimate of the value of home-produced and consumed food, but seldom apply this approach to other household-produced and consumed goods and services.
Beyond this, the variables included within income or expenditure frequently differ. Some countries estimate the rental value of owner-occupied housing and add this to income or expenditures, while others do not. Countries using consumption-based methods sometimes estimate the annual value of the services derived from household-owned durable goods such as vehicles, refrigerators and so forth, other ignore them, others (including Laos) include only some such items. In an important paper, Elbers, et al. (2005) , point out that the precise definition of what is included and excluded is almost never the same across any two countries. Because the importance of these omitted and included items may vary with the level of household expenditures, the differences can affect measured levels of inequality, making comparisons between countries tenuous and may even affect comparisons across time for individual countries. Table 1 illustrates this problem by comparing the data used in the estimation of inequality and poverty for the eight developing countries of Southeast Asia, including Laos. 3 They vary widely. As is well-known, income-based measures (Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) typically show higher levels of inequality than consumption-based measures (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam). Laos measures consumption expenditure per capita at the household level. Expenditure items are divided into food and non-food. Food consumption is recorded using a 30-day diary, which records all food consumed, whether purchased or homeproduced. The value of home-produced food is imputed at current market prices. Non-food expenditures are also recorded over a 30-day period, except for (i) 12 durable goods 4 and rents (cash or imputed) and (ii) a defined set of 'high-value' goods. 5 Category (i) items are excluded from measured consumption expenditure. However, consumption expenditures on category (ii) items are collected over a 12-month period, divided by 12 and then added to other non-food 3 The high-income countries Brunei Darussalam and Singapore are not included in the table. 4 The 12 excluded durable items are beds, dining and lounge suites, stoves with ovens, refrigerators, axes, sewing machines, washing machines, cars and vans, motorcycles, TVs, VCRs, and computers. 5 These included high-value items are: tables and chairs, cupboards, desks and sideboards, stools and benches, carpets, lamps, rugs, mats, pictures, stoves (non-electric), irons, electric fans, bicycles, watches, jewellery, airline tickets, expenses abroad, radio or cassettes players, cameras, other photographic and musical equipment, cellular phones and repairs of such items. monthly expenditures. The excluded items, such as imputed rent from owner-occupied housing (for which Laos is the only example among this group of countries), and at least some seemingly income-elastic durable goods, are likely to form a larger proportion of the true expenditures of richer than poorer households. Cambodia and Myanmar also exclude many durable goods from measured expenditures, though the details vary between these three countries. 6 This almost certainly means that in Laos especially, but also in Cambodia and Myanmar, the use of a consumption-based measure and the exclusion of income-elastic items from measured consumption results in the underestimation of both the level of inequality and the recorded rate of increase over time, relative to most other countries. Table 2 summarizes the mean and median levels of real consumption expenditure per person in Laos for the years 1992-93 and 2012-13, using the Lao Expenditure and Consumption Survey (LECS) data and the nation-wide consumer price index. 7 The data also show the P10 to P90 decile range, meaning the levels of real expenditure per person below which the poorest 10 percent and poorest 90 percent of the population are located, respectively. 8 These data are shown for the total population and for rural and urban areas. The mean exceeds the median in all cases, reflecting the asymmetry of the distribution of expenditures -skewed towards higher levels of expenditure. Both mean and median real expenditures increased in all cases. The P90 to P10 decile values both increased, but the range between them expanded because the proportional increases in the P90 values were much larger, reflecting an increase in the spread of the distribution. The final column shows the coefficient of variation of real expenditures (standard deviation divided by the mean), indicating a 38 percent rise in the dispersion of the distribution of the total population. This proportional change was similar for rural and urban areas. These data are summarized graphically in Figure 2 , with the intermediate years 1997-98 and 2002-03 also shown. In the diagrams, the circular dots at the bottom and top of the vertical lines for each year indicate the P10 and P90 levels of real expenditure, respectively. Leaving aside the somewhat anomalous results for 1997-98, 9 the data show a progressive increase in both mean and median 6 In Myanmar, the 2009-2010 Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment, conducted by the Myanmar government jointly with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), calculated durable goods user cost but ultimately excluded it from non-food consumption expenditures (IHLCA 2011). This produced estimates of the Gini coefficient of 0.19 and poverty incidence of 28 percent. Subsequent calculations reported by the World Bank (2014) used the same survey data but included expenditures on both health and durable goods, along with other statistical changes, leading to substantially higher estimates of both measures: Gini coefficient 0.28; poverty incidence 37.5 percent. 7 The deflator is calculated as the monthly average of the CPI over the 12 months of LECS data collection for each survey period. LECS data are collected from March of one year to February of the following year. For example, LECS 1 data were collected March 1992 to February 1993. The CPI deflator for the LECS 1 survey is thus the simple average of the monthly CPI levels over these 12 months. For the LECS 2 survey it is the average CPI from March 1997 to February 1998, and so forth. 8 By this definition, the median is equivalent to the P50 level of real expenditure. 9 The years 1997-98 were a period of economic turbulence in Laos, as noted above. The contractionary impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, which began in neighbouring Thailand, was followed by a hyperinflation within Laos induced by monetary expansion (Menon and Warr 2013) , during which annual rates of inflation were well over 100 percent. The large and temporary increase in measured inequality in over the period ending in 1997-98 may be partly attributable to those events. The data on real expenditures in 1997-98 may be less reliable than those for other years because the rate of increase in the consumer price index may have been underestimated during the hyperinflation, resulting in overestimation of measured increases in real expenditures. real expenditures, but also a widening of the distribution.
Rising inequality, declining poverty
This widening of the distribution can also be seen in Table 3 , which summarizes shares of total consumption expenditure per person, classified by quintile group (poorest 20 percent, next poorest 20 percent, and so on, up to the richest 20 percent). Over the two decades since the early 1990s, the poorest quintile's share of total consumption declined from 8.7 to 7.6 percent, while the richest quintile's share rose from 40.2 to 44.8 percent. Only the richest quintile group experienced an increase in its share of total consumption; every other quintile group's share declined. Table 4 shows that over the 20-year interval between 1992-93 and 2012-13 average real expenditure per person increased for every quintile group. That is, every quintile group benefited (on average) in real terms, but not at the same rates. Table 5 shows the percentage changes of real expenditures for each quintile group across each of the five-year intervals between the LECS surveys, based on Table 4 , above. By comparing each group with the mean, it can be assessed which group fared better or worse, in proportional terms, from any departures from distributional neutrality. Since we are most interested in long-term changes in inequality and poverty, Table 6 summarizes the proportional change of real expenditure for each quintile group over the full 20year interval from 1992-93 and 2012-13. For quintile 1 (the poorest), real expenditure increased by 30.2 percent, clearly a positive outcome. But the real expenditure of quintile 5 (the richest) increased at more than twice this rate, at 65 percent. Indeed, the proportional increase for each successive quintile group exceeded that for the quintile group below it: the proportional increase for quintile 5 exceed quintile 4, which exceeded quintile 3, and so forth. Only the richest quintile experienced an increase larger than the mean.
If we focus on absolute changes in real consumption, rather than proportional changes, the disparity in the experiences of different quintile groups is amplified and the increase in measured inequality becomes more graphic, because richer groups start with a larger base. 10 These calculations are summarized in the second column of Table 6 , also based on Table 4 , above, showing average real consumption per person in constant 1992-93 prices. Over the two decades average real expenditure per person in quintile 1 increased (in constant 1992-93 prices) by 1,464 kip. For quintile 5 it was ten times this amount, at 14,618 kip. The absolute increase for quintile 5 far exceeded that for quintile 4, which exceeded quintile 3, and so forth. Overall, the poor gained in real terms, but the rich gained much more.
This pattern is revealed even more vividly by Figure 3 , which shows the percentage changes (Panel a) and absolute changes (Panel b) of real income across this 20-year interval, arranged by centile group. Centile 1 (left side of the horizontal axis) is the poorest and centile 100 (right side) is the richest. 11 Focusing first on proportional changes, with the possible exception of the poorest urban centile (urban centile 1), every centile group gained. Moreover, the poorest rural households fared proportionately better than the poorest urban households. But moving across the distribution, proportional gains were larger for higher centile groups in both rural and urban areas. The really large gains, both proportional and absolute, were enjoyed by the top two to three percent of the distribution and this was true in both rural and urban areas.
Standard measures of inequality and poverty incidence confirm the overall story conveyed by these calculations. Table 7 and Figure 4 summarize the LECS data on the level of the Gini coefficient of inequality over this 20-year period. With the partial exception of a high value of the coefficient in 1997-98 (LECS 2), the Gini coefficient increased continuously over the two decades covered by these surveys. This is true at the national level and within both rural and urban areas. The absolute level of the coefficient is consistently higher in urban than in rural areas, but its level increased steadily in both, again with the partial exception of an abnormally high level in 1997-98. Similar findings apply for each of the four major regions of the country. Over the 20-year period, the Gini coefficient increased in all regions. In the most recent five-year period, 2008-08 to 2012-13, the only region in which inequality increased was the South. 12 Finally, Table 8 shows a long-term increase in inequality within every one of the 17 provinces, although in some provinces 1997-98 was an outlier to the pattern of steadily increasing inequality, as it is at the national level.
The LECS surveys identify 50 ethnic groups in Laos. They can be summarized into the four major categories listed in Table 9 . 13 The surveys make it possible to identify ethnic categories only for the years 2002-03 (LECS 3), 2007-08 (LECS 4) and 2012-13 (LECS 5) . Over the decade covered by these data the dominant Lao-Tai group (64 percent of the population) has consistently enjoyed the highest average level of expenditure per person. The level of inequality within this group is the highest of the four categories. Over this decade, the increase in average expenditure per person of the Lao-Tai group group was equal to the population average. Inequality increased among all four ethnic groups, as measured by the Gini coefficient, but the increase within the majority Lao-Tai ethnic group was the smallest. Figure 5 summarizes these changes within a format similar to Figure 3 , above. The three minority ethnic groups are aggregated into a single category, labeled 'minority'. The increase in expenditures per person was heavily concentrated in the top few centile groups within both the Lao-Tai and minority categories, but the concentration at the top was even higher within the minority groups than for the Lao-Tai.
In contrast to this overall picture of rising inequality, Table 10 and Figure 6 show that measured poverty incidence declined steadily over the two decades. This is true at the national level, within both rural and urban areas and within every region. Poverty incidence has been consistently higher in rural than in urban areas, but has declined steadily in both. Again, the message is that the poor became better off in absolute terms, but lost ground relative to all other income groups. The richest few centiles benefited hugely. This basic pattern is evident throughout the country.
Significance of the Rise in Inequality
Was the increase in inequality statistically significant? 12 Mining exports dominate the Southern economy and this may be a driver of the most recent increase in inequality observable there. This recent period also coincides with large increases in FDI in mining and exports of minerals from the South. Nevertheless, the South did not account for the increase in national inequality in any previous five-year interval, nor did any other single region. It seems possible that the causes of rising inequality may have varied over time. 13 The mapping from the 50 LECS categories into these four is: LECS 1 to 8 = Lao-Tai; LECS 9 -40 = Mon-Khmer , LECS 41-47 = Chinese-Tibetan , LECS 48-50 = Mon-Mien. Source: Lao Statistics Bureau, Survey Guide Book, 2002 Book, -3, 2007 Book, -08 and 2012 It is easily overlooked that measures of inequality and poverty are based on sample surveys covering only a small proportion of the population. They produce estimates of the population values of inequality and poverty indicators, but those estimates necessarily entail errors. First, there are measurement errors that occur during the collection of the raw, household-level data. Second, there may be sample bias if the sample is non-representative of the population. Both of these sources of error imply that the expected value of the sample-based estimate may not be equal to the true population value. Statisticians go to great lengths to minimize both of these sources of error, as is done in the case of the LECS surveys. But even if these two sources of error were eliminated, there remains an unavoidable third source of error: sample error arising from the small sample used to estimate the population value. 14 The sample-based estimates are necessarily associated with a standard error, measuring the uncertainty about the reliability of the sample estimate as an indicator of the true population value. When two sample-based estimates are compared over time, the standard error of the difference between the two estimates must be considered in assessing whether the observed difference might reasonably be attributed to chance. It is possible, for example, that a change in measured inequality could be observed purely because of random sample error, when true inequality did not change at all. This could happen even if the first two sources of error outlined above -measurement error and sample bias -were entirely absent. What is the probability that random sample error accounts for the observed increases in inequality described above?
In the analysis that follows, we review the changes in inequality measures, first across the decade 1992-93 to 2002-03 (LECS 1 to LECS 3), then the decade 2002-03 to 2012-13 (LECS 3 to LECS 5) and finally the full two decades 1992-93 to 2012-13 (LECS 1 to LECS 5). The sample based estimated indicate that inequality increased across each of these intervals. But are the estimated increases significantly different from zero? Inequality measures are compared at the national level, meaning that it covers all households in the sample, and within both rural and urban areas. For each of these three levels, we compare Gini coefficients and also a member of the class of Generalized Entropy (GE) measures, the the GE(1) measure, also known as the Theil T index. The importance of the latter is that (along with all other members of the GE class, it has properties that are useful in decomposing inequality and changes in it, which will be important in following sections. This gives six sets of measures and the results are summarized in Tables 11 to 13. The findings provide overall support for the hypothesis that the true population levels of inequality did indeed increase. First, from Table 11 , the measured increase in inequality observed over the decade 1992-93 to 2002-03 (LECS 1 to LECS 3) was, in all cases, statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This can be seen from the fourth column of the table. A p-value less than or equal to 0.05 indicates significance at the 95 percent confidence level and a value less than or equal to 0.01 indicates significance at the 99 percent confidence level. 15 In all cases but one (the Gini coefficient in rural areas) the p-value is less than 0.01, meaning that (except in this one case) we can be 99 percent confident that the true population value did increase. Second, from Table 12 , the measured increases in inequality over the decade 2002-03 to 2012-13 (LECS 3 to LECS 5) were somewhat smaller than those seen over the previous decade and none of the six measures increased significantly at the 95 percent confidence level, except the Gini coefficient in rural areas. Third, from Table 13 , over the two decades 1992-93 (LECS 1) to 2012-13 (LECS 5), all six measures increased significantly at confidence levels of 99 percent or better.
Finally, in Table 14 we apply this methodology to the estimated province-level values of the Gini coefficient over the full two-decade period. Sample sizes are relatively small in some of these provinces, raising the standard errors of the estimates. The Gini coefficient increased in all 17 provinces and the increase was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level or above in 7 of these provinces, When this exercise is repeated with the Theil T index (detailed results not shown, for brevity), an increase in inequality is recorded in 15 out of the 17 provinces, significant at the 95 percent confidence in 8 provinces, with very small, non-significant declines in two.
The findings confirm that a genuine increase in inequality has occurred within Laos. The samplebased increases in measured inequality cannot reasonably be attributed to sample error.
How much did rising inequality affect poverty reduction?
How important were the increases in inequality described above? One way of answering this question is to assess its quantitative impact on poverty reduction. This is done in the present study by decomposing observed changes in poverty incidence into two analytical components: a growth effect and an inequality effect. The growth effect is the change in poverty incidence that would, hypothetically, have occurred if all households' real expenditures had changed at the observed mean rate. That is, it is the estimated amount of poverty reduction that would have occurred if the observed aggregate rate of growth had been distributionally neutral. The inequality effect is the change in poverty incidence occurring because of the departure from distributional neutrality, calculated as the difference between the observed change in poverty incidence and the estimated growth effect. By construction, the growth effect and the distributional effect must add to the observed change. The purpose of the decomposition is analytical -to determine the relative sizes of these two effects. The question of whether changes in inequality are in fact causally related to changes in aggregate growth is not prejudged by this exercise, one way or the other.
The method is illustrated in Figure 7 and the results are summarized in Table 15 . The cumulative distribution of the logarithm of nominal household expenditures is shown by the graphs '1992-93' and '2012-13' , along with the logarithm of the official poverty lines for those years. The vertical intersection between the poverty line and the cumulative distribution gives poverty incidence for the two years, 46.0 percent and 23.2 percent, respectively. The ratio of mean nominal household expenditures in 2012-13 and 1992-93 is 387,143 / 11,170 = 34.66. The hypothetical distribution marked '2012-13*' is computed by multiplying nominal expenditure at every point on the 'LECS 1' distribution by this number 16 , giving the estimated distribution '2012-13*', shown by the dashed line, that preserves the mean of '2012-13', but which retains the same distribution as '1992-93'. Poverty incidence under this hypothetical distribution is then calculated using the 2012-13 poverty line, giving 16.9 percent. The actual change in poverty incidence was 23.2 -46 = -22.8 percent. The growth effect is the difference between poverty incidence under '2012-13*' and '1992-93', or 16.9 -46 = -29.1 percent. The inequality effect is the difference between poverty incidence under '2012-13' and '2012-13*', or 23.2 -16 .9 = 6.3 percent. The growth effect was a reduction in poverty incidence of 29.1 percent (127.6 percent of the observed reduction) and the inequality effect was an increase of 6.3 percent, equivalent to 27.6 percent of the observed decline.
In summary, our estimates quantify the importance of the observed two-decade increase in inequality by assessing its implications for poverty incidence. This is done by describing a hypothetical scenario in which mean expenditures increased at their observed rate, but inequality did not change. In that hypothetical case, national poverty incidence would have declined from 46 percent of the population to 16.9 percent, an annual rate of decline of 1.46 percent of the population. This can be compared with the observed decline to 23.2 percent of the 2012-13 population, an annual rate of poverty reduction of 1.14 percent of the population. That is, if inequality had not changed national poverty incidence would have declined 28 percent more rapidly than it actually did. The implied difference in poverty incidence in 2012-13 was 6.3 percent of the population in that year (the inequality effect), or about 400,000 people out of the total population at that time of 6.5 million.
Inequality Within and Between Groups
To what extent does nation-wide inequality arise from inequality within or between provinces, rural vs. urban areas or different ethnic groups? Similarly, was the increase in inequality at the national level described above mainly due to an increase within or between these categories? We now investigate these questions. The concept of inequality used in this exercise is the Generalized Entropy (GE) class of measures, which has the desirable feature that it can be decomposed into within group and between group components, implying that the level of inequality in a particular year can be divided into a component arising from inequality within groups and a component arising between groups. Similarly, the change in the measure for the population as a whole can be divided into a component arising from the change within groups and one from the change between groups. This decomposability property is unique to the Generalized Entropy class of measures, and that class does not include the Gini coefficient. Neither the level nor the change in the Gini coefficient can be decomposed into within-group and between-group components, except with a residual that lacks a simple intuitive interpretation (Aronson and Lambert 1993; Cowell1995) . Table 16 presents a decomposition of levels of inequality for the five years of LECS data, decomposing total inequality into within-province and between-province components. It does this for three members of the Generalized Entropy class of measures, GE( ), where is a parameter determining the greater sensitivity of the measure to changes at the lower end of the distribution ( below unity) at the upper end ( greater than unity) or equally sensitive ( equal to unity). The three most common measures correspond to = 0, 1 and 2. GE(0) is the Theil L measure, also known as the mean log deviation measure, GE (1) is Theil's T index and the GE(2) measure is also used, but less commonly.
The results using the three GE measures are qualitatively similar. Concentrating on the GE(1) measure, inequality within provinces is the dominant source of overall inequality, accounting for around 85 percent of total inequality. The proportion is slightly higher for = 0 and slightly lower for = 2. Turning to rural vs. urban location as a grouping (Table 17) , within-group inequality is even more dominant, accounting for around 88 percent of total inequality. Differences between provinces and between rural and urban areas contribute to total inequality, but it is variation within provinces and within rural and urban areas that accounts for most of the inequality. Table 18 decomposes changes in inequality over time, concentrating on the GE(1) measure and focusing on the change in inequality over the full two decade interval between LECS 1 and LECS 5. Inequality rose both within and between provinces and the contribution of both effects to the overall increase in inequality was statistically significant. But the increase in between-province inequality explains only 6 percent of the overall increase. Although Table 17 above shows that inequality between rural and urban areas contributes to the level of overall inequality, this statement cannot be made for the change in inequality over time. Rural/urban differences made no contribution to the observed growth of overall inequality in Laos.
Is inequality associated with ethnicity? As noted above, data on ethnicity are available only for LECS 3, LECS 4 and LECS 5. Table 9 above confirms that the dominant Lao-Tai ethnic group enjoys the highest expenditure per person and also exhibits the highest within-group level of inequality in both years. Table 19 decomposes both the level and changes in the GE(1) measure into within-group and between-group components. Between-group inequality accounts for roughly 10 percent of the level of total inequality in each year, but accounts for none of the increase that occurred over this decade; between-group inequality actually declined slightly. Within-group changes account for all of the increase. The explanation for increasing overall inequality apparently does not involve ethnicity.
Inequality in access to public services
The discussion above has focused on inequality of privately-financed consumption expenditures -the goods and services households are able to purchase with their own money. But the public sector also provides goods and services in kind, including educational and health services, and publicly-provided utilities. Their value to households is not captured by data on household expenditures (or incomes). Of course, public services are not provided equally to all households. Some are able to access them more effectively than others. Standard measures of inequality therefore fail to capture the inequality that arises from this component of full household consumption. The LECS data do capture household utilization of some components of publicly provided services and utilities, especially education and health services and access to electricity networks. We now turn to these data. Table 20 shows participation rates by expenditure quintile for primary education and lower secondary schooling, respectively. For convenience of interpretation, these data are converted, in panels a and b of Figure 8 , into the participation rates of the poorest four quintiles (Q1 to Q4) relative to the richest quintile (Q5). Richer quintiles consistently enjoy higher participation rates for both levels of education. Nevertheless, in both cases, most especially primary education, the disparity between participation rates has declined over time. This pattern corresponds to 'early capture' by the richest groups, with richer groups initially able to capture a high proportion of the service provided, but with that advantage gradually eroding as the level of provision rises (Warr, Menon and Rasphone 2014) . Table 21 and panels c, d and e of Figure 8 performs a similar exercise for health care utilization rates, measured as utilization of outpatient care at hospitals and primary health centers and finally household access to the public electricity grid. 17 Again, the richest quintiles initially make the most use of these facilities and the disparity between the poorest and richest quintiles has declined over time. 18 In interpreting these findings, it must be stressed that the data measure the quantity of the public service delivered but not the quality. Subject to this limitation of the data, the distribution of publicly-provided services has apparently become more equal over time.
Conclusions
The available data show that over the last two decades the distribution of private household expenditures has become more unequal in Laos, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.311 to 0.364, even though absolute poverty incidence has halved, from 46 to 23 percent. The samplebased estimates on which these statements are based indicate that the measured increase in inequality is statistically significant. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that increased inequality has reduced the average rate of poverty reduction per year by about 28 percent, meaning the actual rate compared with the counterfactual rate that would have occurred if the mean real expenditures had increased at their observed levels but inequality had not changed. When the data are decomposed into rural and urban areas of residence or by province, or by the ethnicity of the household head, the increase in inequality within groups dominates any changes between groups; inequality has increased throughout the country. In contrast, access to publicly provided services (primary education, lower secondary education and access to health care) has become more equal; disparities in participation rates between richer and poorer groups have diminished.
Whether the increase in expenditure inequality is already a serious public policy problem for Laos is debatable. Some increases in inequality may be inevitable in a poor country undertaking a widereaching program of economic reform, as in Laos over the past two decades. Nevertheless, if inequality continues to increase at the rate shown by this study, this issue is sure to become a focus for policy concern, even if it is not one already.
Two important research questions remain unanswered by this study and may be fruitful areas for future study. First, what economic or other forces have driven the increase in private expenditure inequality demonstrated in this paper? Second, to what extent is rising inequality in the distribution of private consumption mitigated by the more equal distribution of publicly-provided services? The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. 'Decile range' means, in the case of P10, the level of real expenditure below which the poorest 10 percent of the population is located and in the case of P90 the level below which the poorest 90 percent of the distribution is located.
Source: Authors' estimations, using LECS data and consumer price index data from Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB), Vientiane. Jenkins (2008) , which uses the method of Kovacevic and Binder (1997) . Standard errors for Theil's T index are based on the STATA command of Biewen and Jenkins (2006) , which uses the method of Woodruff (1971) . 3) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively. 
Note: GE(0), GE(1) and GE(2) refer to the Generalized Entropy GE( ) inequality measures, with = 0, 1 and 2, respectively (Cowell 1995) . Source: Authors' calculations, using LECS data from Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB), Vientiane. Table 11 on the meaning of round and square parentheses. 4. p-values are calculated using the methods of Barrett and Pendakur (1995) and Davidson and Duclos (2000) . 5. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively.
Source: Authors' calculations, using LECS data from Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB), Vientiane. Note: 'Hospital-based outpatient care' and 'primary health center care' mean the number of times the service was accessed in the previous month, divided by the population, multiplied by 100. Because one individual may have accessed the service more than once during that month, this number may exceed the proportion of the population who accessed the service. 'Electricity supply to home' means the proportion of houses connected to the electricity grid. These data are unavailable for 1992-93 (LECS 1) and 1997-98 (LECS 2). Source: Authors' calculations, using LECS data from Lao Statistics Bureau (LSB), Vientiane. 
